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Abstract 
Many economists and policymakers believe that fiscal decentralization, the decentralization of government 
expenditures to local governments, enhances public sector efficiency. Vertical externalities – i.e. spillovers 
between local and central government – may however undo part of this advantage. In this paper, we assess 
spillover effects of Social Assistance (SA) decentralization in the Netherlands, in particular towards (a centrally 
administered) Disability Insurance scheme (DI). DI enrolment strongly increased since the decentralization of 
SA. We find that the sensitivity of local DI enrolment with respect to the stock of local SA recipients has 
increased over time, given that we control for both observed and unobserved disability risk factors. IV estimates 
show that, since the decentralization of SA, at least one third of DI inflow was diverted from SA. 
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, vertical externalities, social assistance, disability insurance 
JEL code: H40; H53; H70 
Abstract in Dutch 
Veel economen en beleidsmakers geloven dat decentralisering van taken naar lagere overheden leidt tot 
efficiëntere besteding van overheidsgelden. Verticale externaliteiten – dat wil zeggen afwentelingsgedrag tussen 
verschillende overheidslagen – kunnen de efficiencywinst echter (deels) tenietdoen. In deze studie gaan we na 
of bij de decentralisering van de bijstand naar gemeenten sprake is geweest van afwentelingsgedrag naar de 
Wajong. De instroom in de Wajong is in de periode na de decentralisering van de bijstand immers steeds verder 
toegenomen. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat deze instroom steeds gevoeliger is geworden voor het aantal 
bijstandsgerechtigden, wat erop duidt dat gemeenten een prikkel ervaren om bijstandsgerechtigden richting de 
Wajong te dirigeren. Modelschattingen laten zien dat minimaal een derde van de instroom in de Wajong sinds 
2004 het resultaat is geweest van afwenteling vanuit de bijstand. 
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1 The authors thank Rob Alessie, Frits Bos, Wolter Hassink, Pierre Koning, Coen Teulings, Wouter Vermeulen, 
and Bas ter Weel for helpful discussions, and Peter Dekker and Sijmen Duineveld for research assistance. We 
also thank APE, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), and UWV for providing the data. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Dutch Social Assistance scheme (SA) was gradually decentralized from central government to 
municipalities during the early 21st century. Over the same period, the inflow into the Disability Insurance 
scheme for individuals with no employment history (DI)
2 has more than doubled. By 2008, a rapidly growing 
share of 1.7% of the Dutch population between the ages of 18 and 65 were receiving benefits from this scheme. 
The DI scheme is fully financed by the central government. There is a general perception that the reform of the 
SA scheme has contributed to the increased inflow into DI. Municipalities may have been tempted to redirect 
(potential) SA recipients to the DI scheme as a result of their increased financial responsibility for Social 
Assistance. A similar issue seems to play in the US, where states have an incentive to keep their welfare rolls 
low and push people towards the federally funded SSI scheme.
3 The main purpose of this paper is to investigate 
whether the misalignment of the central government‟s and local governments‟ interests has indeed played a role 
in the increase of DI inflow. 
  Many economists and policymakers believe that fiscal decentralization, the decentralization of 
expenditure responsibilities to lower-level government, enhances public sector efficiency. The empirical 
literature on the effect of fiscal decentralization on government efficiency is however remarkably small. Adam 
et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between decentralization and public sector efficiency based on 
comparisons between 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000. In a specific study on education 
decentralization in Switzerland, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) also find a robust, positive effect (as measured 
by educational outcomes). On the other hand, Ahmad et al. (2008) find mixed empirical evidence for OECD 
countries. It is clear both from the (large) theoretical and the (small) empirical literature that, apart from its 
merits, decentralization may have some adverse effects as well. The existing empirical studies however typically 
estimate reduced-form models to determine the total effect of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency. 
Specific (positive or negative) aspects of fiscal decentralization have not been assessed separately. In this paper, 
we empirically assess the importance of one particular aspect of fiscal decentralization, namely the magnitude of 
a vertical externality triggered by the decentralization of Social Assistance. To the authors‟ knowledge, this is 
the first empirical study trying to quantitatively assess the importance of externalities between local and central 
government. 
  An important virtue of fiscal decentralization is that local governments may be given an incentive to 
minimize costs.
4 If the local government bears political responsibility, then voters will use the performance of 
comparable local governments as a benchmark for the performance of theirs (Besley and Smart, 2007). In 
addition, the central government may benchmark performances in order to efficiently allocate funds to local 
governments (Shleifer, 1985). Empirical evidence indeed points at yardstick competition enhancing the 
efficiency of local governments (Besley and Case, 1995). A second advantage of decentralization is that the 
electoral control over the provision of public services may increase (Seabright, 1996). Finally, lower-level 
governments are better able to adjust policy to local preferences, which may be welfare-enhancing (Cremer et 
al., 1996). 
  On the other hand, a well-known drawback of decentralization is that the costs of production may 
increase as a result of economies of scale. The production of some public services involves an important fixed 
cost component, and is therefore efficiently organized at a large scale. In practice, the problem of scale 
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3 See The Economist of March 12, 2011 (pp. 48-49). 
4 For a more elaborate discussion on the pros and cons of fiscal decentralization, see Bos (2010). 3 
 
economies can however be resolved by separating provision from production through outsourcing, 
subcontracting, or a proper division of responsibilities between the central and local government (Ahmad et al., 
2008; Dafflon, 2008; Boadway and Shah, 2009). An example is a decentralized education system where local 
governments bear full operational responsibility, but where the central state is responsible for teacher training 
and quality controls. Economies of scope may also play a role. Separation of public services may increase total 
costs. For instance, if the unemployment insurance scheme is administered centrally and a scheme for the long-
term unemployed (e.g., Social Assistance) is decentralized, then the transfer of an unemployed person from one 
scheme to the other may incur additional administrative costs. A third potential drawback of decentralization is 
that local politicians may be less competent than politicians at the more central level. Results in Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007) indicate that decentralization is more effective when the local government is competent. A 
fourth argument found in the literature is that decentralization may lead to increased pressure from local interest 
groups. This may distort policy choice and waste public funds. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) however show 
that the link between decentralization and lobbying is ambiguous, i.e., the link can be either negative or positive. 
  The fifth potential drawback of fiscal decentralization is that it may induce spillovers between different 
local governments (Lockwood, 2002; Besley and Coate, 2003) or between a local government and the central 
government. That is, local governments may ignore potential external benefits, or try to divert costs to other 
governments. Solutions to the case of spillovers between local governments, or horizontal fiscal externalities, 
are in principle quite straightforward,
5 although not easy to implement (Boadway and Shah, 2009). A particular 
problem is that it is often difficult to determine the exact size of the spillover. The case of spillovers between 
local and central government, or vertical fiscal externalities, has received less attention. The focus is on tax 
externalities (see, e.g., Keen, 1998) while vertical externalities on the expenditure side have hardly received any 
attention at all. In this study, we focus precisely on this last aspect of fiscal decentralization. Did the 
decentralization of social assistance in the Netherlands lead to an increased use of centrally administered social 
insurance? 
  Our empirical analysis makes use of data at the municipality level gathered by Statistics Netherlands and 
the national administration for social insurance (UWV). The data set contains the inflow into SA and DI, the 
outflow from SA, and variables that may influence these flows during the period 2001-2008. A simultaneous 
model for the three flows is estimated. The focus is on the fraction of SA flows that are diverted to DI. The 
identification of this fraction is based on the sensitivity of DI inflow to (lagged) SA volume. SA volume should 
under normal circumstances not impact DI inflow, given that we control for „true‟ disability risks at the 
municipality level. The observed risk factors include population characteristics, such as education, general 
disability risk, and demographic and labour market indicators. Moreover, the use of panel data allows us to 
control for unobserved disability risks. Robustness checks with respect to endogeneity of our instrument, serial 
correlation, the error distribution, and unobserved heterogeneity are included. In all estimations, we find that the 
sensitivity of DI inflow to SA volume has significantly increased following the fiscal decentralization of SA. 
Results imply that at least one third, and possibly more than half, of the entire inflow into the DI scheme in the 
years 2006-2008 was in fact diverted from SA. These results shed new light on the driving forces behind 
increasing DI enrolment rates, which are also observed elsewhere and sometimes tentatively linked to vertical 
externalities between different layers of government. The negative externality found in this paper is sufficiently 
large that it cannot be neglected when assessing whether the fiscal decentralization of SA was a success. 
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  The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the Dutch institutional context. We 
then describe our data set and empirical approach in more detail in Sections 3 and 4, respectively, and present 
the estimation results in Section 5. We summarize and discuss our conclusions in Section 6. 
2.  Social Assistance and Disability Insurance in the Netherlands 
2.1  Social Assistance (SA) 
Social Assistance is the basic welfare scheme in the Netherlands. Roughly speaking, anyone who is on the job 
market and „actively‟ looking for work is entitled to Social Assistance (SA). Claims are means tested; household 
wealth cannot exceed about 5,000 euros per person, and household income must be below SA level. In general, 
all other welfare and insurance schemes take precedence. For instance, a recently unemployed worker entitled to 
Unemployment Benefits will usually not receive Social Assistance. SA benefits can be claimed from the local 
municipality‟s Social Service only after registering as unemployed with the administration responsible for 
employee insurance schemes (UWV). SA recipients are obliged to apply for work and accept any (reasonable) 
offer. In practice, the latter is not enforced rigorously for recent entrants into the scheme; they are allowed some 
time to wait for an offer matching their qualifications. The young and poorly qualified are typically offered a job 
and/or training immediately in so-called „work first‟ projects. This group is overrepresented in the SA inflow. 
They have difficulties establishing themselves on the labour market and, when unemployed, they are usually not 
entitled to other benefits such as Unemployment Insurance, for they have typically had short work histories and 
fixed-term contracts. The overall age distribution of the inflow into Social Assistance is shown in Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1  Age distribution of the inflow into Social Assistance in 2001, 2004 and 2007 (source: Statistics 
Netherlands). 
 
SA benefits amount to 50% of the minimum wage for single households, 70% for single parents, and 100% for 
couples. In 2008, these amounts equal 630, 882, and 1260 euros per month, respectively (but additional benefits 
typically apply to cover the cost of housing for the former groups). Until the year 2001, municipalities were 
almost fully reimbursed by the central government for their actual SA expenses, giving them little incentive to 
reduce the number of SA recipients. From 2001 onward, the fraction of SA expenditure that is reimbursed has 
been gradually reduced. Large and medium-sized municipalities receive predetermined SA budgets based on an 
expenditures model which takes various social and economic characteristics as inputs. Small municipalities 5 
 
receive SA budgets based on (but not necessarily equal to) historical expenses. Deficits have to be covered by 
municipalities‟ own cash flows (e.g., local taxes) while surpluses can be freely spent. The main transition 
towards decentralized financial responsibility took place in 2004. As of 2007 the expenditures model fully 
determines the SA budgets for municipalities larger than 40,000 inhabitants. Municipalities smaller than 25,000 
(before 2008: 30,000) receive budgets based on historical expenditure, and an interpolation rule applies to 
municipalities of intermediate size. Figure 2.2 depicts the introduction of SA budgeting as a function of 
municipality size. As of 2008 about 85% of the total budget for Social Assistance in the Netherlands is based on 
the expenditures model. The remaining 15% is budgeted based on historical expenses. 
Figure 2.2  Timeline of introduction of Social Assistance budgeting, as a function of municipality 
population. Prior to 2001, 90% of actual SA expenditure was reimbursed by the central government. As of 2004, 
municipalities only receive predetermined SA budgets and carry full financial responsibility for deficits (source: 
Van Es, 2010). 
 
 
2.2  Disability Insurance (DI) 
Disability Insurance schemes in the Netherlands are administered by the national social insurance administration 
UWV. These schemes insure the individual‟s earnings capacity. The two most important schemes are for 
employees and for persons with no employment history. The latter is central to this paper, and will simply be 
referred to as DI. Benefits for employees depend on the actual loss of earnings capacity; benefits for persons 
with no employment history depend on the minimum wage. The employee scheme is funded by employer and 
employee premiums, while the DI scheme is funded directly from national tax revenues. Local governments 
bear no financial responsibility. The DI scheme is open to those who were disabled before the age of 18 and to 
students who become disabled before the age of 30. Apart from the requirement of being disabled for at least 6 
 
25%, defined as having an earnings capacity of no more than 75% of the minimum wage, there are fewer 
conditions than for Social Assistance. Most importantly, households are not means tested, and there is no job 
search or training requirement if fully disabled. If the DI recipient does find a job (potentially subsidized), his or 
her income may reach 120% of the minimum wage before the DI allowance is trimmed, so as to provide an 
incentive to work if capacity allows. The DI payout is slightly higher: 75% of the minimum wage when fully 
disabled, compared to 50% (or 70% for singles) for SA, but additional benefits for SA recipients typically offset 
this difference. By design of the scheme, DI inflow mostly occurs between the ages of 18 and 30. Since the SA 
inflow is also skewed towards the young (see figure 2.1), there is substantial overlap in terms of age. 
2.3  Recent trends  
Figure 2.3 shows the nationally aggregated inflow into the DI scheme. It features a pronounced upward trend. 
The inflow has increased since the late 1990s, and the increase started to accelerate in 2001. The biggest jump 
was in 2006 (+30%). The scheme started in 1976, so the first entrants will reach the age of 65 in 2023, at which 
point they will transfer to the state pension scheme. However, because the inflow has increased steadily in 
recent years the scheme will not reach its structural level before 2040 (Van Sonsbeek, 2011). 
Figure 2.3  In- and outflow of Social Assistance (SA) and Disability Insurance (DI), per year (source: 
Statistics Netherlands, UWV). 
 
Analysis of a sample of files over the period 2002-2006 for four selected municipalities (UWV, 2007) has 
shown that, in 2006, the majority of those flowing into DI came directly from school (32%), mostly at the age of 
18 or 19 (67% of the total). Further large numbers came from „other institutions‟ (21%), Social Assistance 
(14%), and home (11%). These fractions vary over the years. There is a remarkable increase in the flow coming 
from Social Assistance, which increased by 77% in 2006. This does not include those who applied for Social 
Assistance, but were diverted directly to DI. The inflow of persons with physical disabilities has remained fairly 
constant, while the inflow of persons with (mild or very mild) mental impairments has increased. The latter 
categories include, for example, spectrum disorders such as ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) 
and ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder). In the above sample for 2006, 16% of those flowing into DI had an 
indication of a physical disability. For the subset coming from Social Assistance, this figure was 8% (UWV, 
2007). 7 
 
  The increased flow towards DI may be related to the SA funding reforms described in the previous 
section. Financial responsibility for DI has remained with the central government while financial responsibility 
for SA has shifted to local governments. This may have given local governments an incentive to try and divert 
SA recipients to DI and other schemes. In fact, private companies have started to offer services to screen 
municipalities‟ databases for SA recipients that can potentially be redirected to DI (UWV, 2007). There may, 
however, be other factors. For instance, it has been remarked that the number of children going to practice 
schools or advanced special schools intended for children with learning difficulties has increased over the last 
decade. Roughly half of all children leaving these schools flow directly into DI, and this percentage may have 
increased due to improved information services targeting these groups (UWV, 2007). 
3.  Data 
Our data set is a balanced panel of administrative data of all Dutch municipalities over the period 2001 to 2008, 
covering yearly SA inflow and outflow rates and DI inflow rates, as well as a variety of socio-economic 
indicators. The data are obtained from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and from the national administration of 
employee insurance schemes in the Netherlands (UWV). They cover, in principle, the entire Dutch population. 
Outflow out of DI is not included as a variable since it is low, fairly constant, and not directly relevant for 
answering our research question. Several variables related to the regional job market (our business-cycle 
indicators) were obtained at the so-called „COROP‟ cluster level, which is a higher level of aggregation than the 
municipality level. COROP clusters cover an average of 11 neighbouring municipalities, typically arranged 
around an urban core, but have no particular hierarchical structure otherwise. During the period of observation 
several municipalities merged (of the 504 that existed in 2001), so for each year the data have been recompiled 
according to the municipality boundaries as of January 1st 2009 (441 in total). The smallest municipality, the 
island of Schiermonnikoog, was excluded because of poor statistics, leaving 440 units in the panel with a total 
of 3520 data points for the 8-year period. 
Table 3.1  Sample statistics, unweighted 2001 & 2008 cross sections (N=440) 
1Percentage of population aged 18-64. 
2Percentage of working population. 
3Percentage of population living in areas with >1000 addresses per square km. 
4Percentage of recipients aged 18-34 at beginning of period (average of four quarters). 
5COROP cluster level. 
  2001  2008 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                 
Inflow SA (Sin)
1  0.60  0.40  0.00  2.48  0.54  0.37  0.00  2.43 
Outflow SA (Sout)
1  0.65  0.46  0.00  2.84  0.59  0.41  0.00  2.65 
Inflow DI (Din)
1  0.06  0.04  0.00  0.38  0.13  0.06  0.00  0.50 
                 
Immigrant population
1  11.71  6.84  1.95  53.25  12.45  7.38  2.47  49.21 
Low-skilled workers
2,5  28.48  4.00  18.27  39.44  24.04  3.43  17.39  30.84 
DI Other
1  7.07  1.65  3.51  13.41  5.01  1.23  2.44  9.62 
Urbanisation
3  33.39  34.38  0.00  100.00  36.10  34.44  0.00  99.74 
Rented housing (%)  36.87  10.17  14.16  81.44  33.73  7.95  13.15  68.04 
Single parents (%)  12.24  3.86  6.88  38.25  14.69  4.25  7.42  37.94 
SA volume (1-lag)
1  1.79  1.33  0.34  10.57  1.57  1.08  0.28  7.98 
Aged 18-19
1  3.65  0.52  2.40  7.07  3.73  0.49  1.30  6.92 
Aged 20-29
1  17.98  3.05  10.91  35.89  16.06  3.30  5.56  35.40 
Outflow UI (%)
4,5  65.81  5.78  54.69  79.55  83.19  4.80  71.43  100.00 
GDP growth (%, 1-lag)
5  3.99  1.57  1.10  9.00  3.64  1.66  -2.60  8.80 8 
 
 
Observed variables include the relative volumes of the immigrant population, low-skilled working population, 
disability benefits recipients (other than those in the DI scheme for the young considered here), degree of 
urbanisation, rented housing, one-parent families, Social Assistance recipients, 18-19 year olds, 20-29 year olds, 
regional GDP growth rate, and outflow out of unemployment benefits. Sample statistics for the 2001 and 2008 
cross sections are shown in Table 3.1. About 0.6% of the population aged 18-64 flow into and out of SA each 
year; for DI the yearly inflow rate is 0.1% on average. These figures differ substantially between municipalities. 
The inflow into DI in 2008 is twice as high as in 2001, while the SA flows do not change much; this reflects the 
trends seen in Figure 2.1. The intermediate years (2002-2007) largely follow the trends observed in Table 3.1 
for all variables; variation between municipalities is typically much larger than variation over time within 
municipalities. There are only few zeros in the SA and DI flows: about 1% of municipalities have zero SA 
inflow, SA outflow or DI inflow in a given year. 
4.  Empirical strategy 
4.1  Model 
Substitution from SA to DI may occur in two different ways. First, municipalities may redirect SA applicants „at 
the gate‟, so that SA inflow is substituted with DI inflow. Second, municipalities may go through their SA files 
to see if anyone may be eligible for DI benefits. This way, an increase in DI inflow is directly linked to an 
increase in SA outflow. Formally, substitution of SA with DI in municipality i at time t can be written as: 
,, 1 in it t in it Ss   (4.1) 
,, 1 out it t out it Ss   (4.2) 
, , , , in it in it t in it t out it D d s s   (4.3) 
All flows are expressed as fractions of the total population aged 18-64. The observed flows into SA, out of SA, 
and into DI are written as Sin, Sout, and Din respectively, and the corresponding „natural‟ flows are written as sin, 
sout, and din. Substitution between SA and DI is parameterized by λ and µ. The observed flow into SA is the 
natural flow minus fraction λ, and the observed flow out of SA is the natural flow plus fraction µ. Both lead to 
an increased observed inflow into DI. 
  The natural flows into and out of SA and into DI are assumed to (potentially) depend on a set of control 
variables x0. In addition, a set of identifying variables xb are assumed to affect the natural in- and outflow of SA 
but not the natural inflow into DI. The natural flows into and out of SA and into DI are modelled as: 
0 , , , ,0 it s in it b it b it s s s x x u   (4.4) 
0 , , 0 ,, f out it it b i bf t f it s x x u   (4.5) 
0 , 0, , in it it d it d d x u   (4.6) 
where the error terms  0 ~ (0, ) u N may be correlated. The combination of (4.1) to (4.6) results in the following 
model for the observed flows: 
, 0 , , 0 , s in it it b it s it bs S x x v   (4.7) 
0 , , 0 ,, f out it it b i bf t f it S x x v   (4.8) 
, 0 , , 0 , d in it it b it d it bd D x x v   (4.9) 9 
 
with correlated error terms  ~ (0, ) N .
6 The parameters in γ and Σ can be expressed in terms of the parameters 
in β, Σ0 and the substitution parameters λ and µ (see Appendix A). These expressions will be used to determine 
the substitution parameters λ and µ from the estimated coefficients in γ. A minimum of two identifying variables 
have to be included in xb in order to have simultaneous identification of the parameters λ and μ. Alternatively, 
we can assume that either λ or μ equals zero, thereby (hypothetically) ascribing all observed substitution of DI 
for SA to either diverted outflow out of SA or diverted inflow into SA. In this case xb needs to have a minimum 
of one element.  
4.2  Identification 
The identifying variables in xb must impact the natural SA flows, but not disability risk (the „natural DI inflow‟). 
They should not influence disability risk provided that we control for (potential) true risk factors via x0. We will 
use the population fraction receiving Social Assistance in the previous period, SA-1, as the identifying variable 
xb. This variable is likely correlated with SA flows, but it should not have any causal effect on disability risk. 
Correlation between SA-1 and disability risk is unlikely because we control for both observed and unobserved 
disability risk factors using the panel dimension of our data. Any effect of SA-1 on DI inflow is then interpreted 
to be due to municipalities diverting potential SA recipients to DI. In other words, a significantly nonzero effect
bd is a direct sign of substitution via λ and/or μ. 
  The control variables may influence both the natural DI inflow and the SA flows. The control variables 
should (ideally) include all population characteristics that influence the natural DI inflow or „true‟ disability 
risk. As an important control variable, we include the fraction of the population aged 18-64 who receive 
disability benefits excluding those receiving benefits from the DI scheme for the young considered in this paper. 
The assumption is that this „DI Other‟ rate should correlate strongly with a broad range of population 
characteristics that influence true disability risk. Age is a second important risk factor that has to be controlled 
for, since the DI scheme is specifically for individuals with no employment history. Because DI benefits can be 
claimed from age 18, we include the fraction of 18-19 year olds in the population aged 18-64 (see also Section 
2). Since the DI scheme is further intended for students who become disabled before the age of 30, we also 
include the population fraction aged 20-29 as a control variable. Individuals aged 30 and over are not expected 
to flow into the DI scheme under consideration. As further control variables we include the fraction of jobs in 
the region that are classified as low skilled, the population fraction living in urban areas, the fraction of housing 
that is rented, the fraction of single-parent families, and the population fraction of immigrants.  
    In addition to these potential population risk factors, we allow for business-cycle effects and control for 
them in two ways. First, we have allowed for some „true‟ correlation between the SA in- and outflows and the 
DI inflow via the correlated error terms of the three natural flow equations (4.4)-(4.6). Second, we add a set of 
regional job-market indicators to the control variables x0, namely (lags of) regional GDP growth and outflow out 
of Unemployment Insurance (UI). Thus we allow (but do not require) the business cycle to be a true disability 
risk factor, arguing that a young person with relatively mild impairments may be able to find or hold on to a job 
more easily if the economy in the region is booming. 
4.3  Estimation 
The model consists of a structural form, (4.4)-(4.3), and a reduced form, (4.7)-(4.9). We obtain the parameters of 
the structural model, which include the substitution parameters λ and μ, in two steps. In the first step, the 
reduced-form parameters  { , } R in (4.7)-(4.9) are estimated from the data using Maximum Likelihood, 
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giving ˆ . R  An estimate of the full covariance matrix of  R  is also obtained (the inverse Hessian of the negative 
log-likelihood at the maximum). In the second step, the structural parameters  0 { , , , } in (4.4)-(4.3) are 
estimated using a Minimum Distance estimator. Denote expressions of the reduced-form parameters in terms of 
the structural parameters as  ( ). R g
7 A consistent estimate of θ then follows from minimizing the distance 
between the first-step estimator  ˆ
R  and ( ): g  
1 2 ˆˆ ˆ
R R R S g g   (4.10) 
where the metric tensor 
1 ˆ
R equals the inverse of the covariance matrix of  ˆ
R (see Chamberlain, 1984). The 
covariance matrix of the structural parameters θ is estimated as 
1
1 ˆˆ ˆˆ
R , where 
ˆ
() ˆ g
.  (4.11) 
5.  Results 
5.1  Cross-Section Estimation 
We begin by estimating the reduced-form model (4.7)-(4.9) for each yearly cross-section in our panel. We retain 
maximum flexibility by allowing all coefficients (and constants) to vary per year. Since each equation contains a 
year-specific constant, time trends, and effects of macroeconomic variables (say an aggregate business cycle 
effect) are accounted for in the econometric specification. Spurious correlations due to trends in variables, which 
are a relatively important source of within-municipality variability but small compared to between-municipality 
variability, are avoided with this approach. On the other hand, we need to be careful with bias due to unobserved 
heterogeneity between municipalities. This will be further investigated in the next subsection. 
  Results of the reduced-form estimation for 2008 are shown in table 5.1. The results for other years can be 
found in the Appendix. As expected, the fraction of the population aged 18-64 receiving Social Assistance in the 
previous period (SA-1) correlates strongly with the SA flows in the current period. The SA-1 volume also 
correlates strongly with DI inflow, which is rather more surprising. In the previous sections we anticipated two 
DI risk indicators, namely the fraction of the population receiving disability benefits excluding the DI scheme 
under study („DI Other‟), and the population fraction aged 18-19. While these two indeed have a significant, 
positive effect on DI inflow, their effects are still much smaller than the effect of SA-1. The estimated 
coefficients on SA-1 therefore suggest substitution. The expected large correlations between SA-1 and the SA 
flows „spill over‟ to the DI inflow equation, as in Eq. (4.1)-(4.3), causing the unexpected effect of SA-1 on DI 
inflow. It can be seen from the relative effects of SA-1 (Table 5.1) that a spillover of order 10% from either SA 
outflow or SA inflow to DI inflow may explain the observed effect of SA-1 on DI inflow in 2008. 
  In practice, substitution between SA and DI may occur through both SA inflow and SA outflow. With 
just one identifying variable (SA-1), we cannot estimate both substitution parameters λ and μ simultaneously. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to earmark additional identifying variables that (1) significantly influence SA 
inflow, SA outflow and DI inflow; (2) are in theory not expected to influence the „natural‟ DI inflow; and (3) are 
not expected to correlate strongly with the SA-1 variable. The reason is simple: one expects both diverted flows 
from SA to DI to be very similar in terms of underlying population characteristics, hence any two identifying 
variables are expected to be strongly correlated. This makes it unlikely that γbs and γbf in Eqs. (4.7)-(4.8) will be 
                                                            
7  See Appendix A. 11 
 
(significantly) linearly independent as required for simultaneous identification of λ and μ. Fortunately though, 
this issue does not hamper our main conclusions since we are first and foremost interested in total substitution 
 between the two schemes. In this case one instrument suffices to identify total substitution. 
Table 5.1  Estimates (x100), 2008 cross section (N=440) 
Regressor  SA Inflow (Sin)  SA Outflow (Sout)  DI Inflow (Din) 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Reduced form estimates           
Constant  -0.227  0.201  -0.030  0.193  -0.067  0.069 
Immigrant population  -0.441*  0.189  -0.716*  0.181  -0.191*  0.065 
Low-skilled workers
†  0.752*  0.359  0.900*  0.364  0.069  0.153 
DI Other  0.565  0.697  -1.047  0.670  1.562*  0.239 
Urbanisation  0.021  0.032  -0.006  0.030  0.019  0.011 
Rented Housing  -0.393*  0.153  -0.253  0.147  0.058  0.053 
Single Parents  -0.362  0.451  0.480  0.434  -0.322*  0.155 
Aged 18-19  -1.240  1.800  -4.155*  1.731  1.730*  0.620 
Aged 20-29  -0.294  0.309  0.215  0.297  0.105  0.106 
UI Outflow
†  -0.184  0.322  -0.092  0.327  -0.036  0.137 
UI Outflow-1
†  0.221  0.475  0.075  0.485  0.012  0.205 
UI Outflow-2
†  0.509  0.502  0.264  0.510  0.075  0.214 
GDP-1
†  -0.003  0.007  -0.009  0.007  -0.004  0.003 
GDP-2
†  -0.008  0.006  -0.010  0.006  0.002  0.003 
SA-1/100  0.358*  0.013  0.381*  0.013  0.032*  0.005 
Covariance matrix             
Sin  0.0194  0.0013  0.0103  0.0010  0.0005  0.0003 
Sout      0.0180  0.0012  0.0003  0.0003 
Din          0.0023  0.0002 
Structural estimates             
SA-1/100  0.390*  0.014  0.349*  0.013  -  - 
λ  0.083*  0.011  -  -     
µ  -  -  0.093*  0.014     
†Regressor at the COROP aggregate level; standard errors corrected for bias due to spatial correlation within clusters 
according to Moulton (1990). 
The bottom part of table 5.1 shows the structural-form estimates of the model (4.1)-(4.6) obtained by minimum 
distance estimation of (4.10), under the identifying assumption that the observed effect of SA-1 on DI inflow is 
either due to substitution from SA inflow to DI inflow (via λ), or due to substitution from SA outflow to DI 
inflow (via µ). We see that a substitution fraction of about 9% obtains in either case. Since the observed effect 
of SA-1 on DI inflow may be due to substitution from both SA inflow and SA outflow simultaneously, total 
substitution may be any convex combination of the two separate estimates. It should be noted that these 
estimates may be on the high side as we did not take account of unobserved heterogeneity. In the next 
subsection we will control for that, and see whether total substitution is indeed lower than 9%. 
  Repeating this analysis for the other years in our data set, we obtain the results shown in Table 5.2 and 
Figures 5.1-5.4. Figure 5.1 shows the reduced-form estimates of the effect of SA-1 on the three flows. Even more 
interesting than the large effect of SA-1 on DI inflow per se is the substantial increase we observe in this effect 
after 2004. The corresponding structural-form estimates of the substitution parameters λ and μ (still assuming 
that substitution occurs via either diverted SA inflow or increased SA outflow, that is, via either λ or μ) are 
shown in Figure 5.2. We see that a threefold increase in substitution, from about 3% in 2001-2004 to about 10% 
in 2006-2008, is needed to explain the observed effects of SA-1 on DI inflow. Expressed as a percentage of total 
DI inflow we see that about more than one third of DI inflow appears to be diverted from SA, increasing to two-12 
 
thirds in 2006-2007 (Figure 5.3). Since DI inflow has increased strongly over these years, the absolute number 
of persons that appear to be diverted from SA has in fact more than doubled, as shown in Figure 5.4. As the 
solid and dashed line in Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 practically coincide, the separate restricted estimates of λ and μ are 
directly indicative of total substitution between SA and DI for all years (but we cannot say whether substitution 
predominantly occurs via diverted SA inflow or SA outflow). 
Table 5.2  Substitution parameters and standard errors for the cross-section model 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
λ  0.032  (0.010)  0.025  (0.009)  0.036  (0.009)  0.029  (0.009)  0.052  (0.008)  0.090  (0.010)  0.116  (0.011)  0.083  (0.011) 
μ  0.027  (0.009)  0.025  (0.010)  0.043  (0.011)  0.033  (0.010)  0.056  (0.010)  0.087  (0.011)  0.107  (0.013)  0.093  (0.015) 
 
Figure 5.1  Estimated effects of a 1%-point increase in the SA-1 rate on the SA inflow, SA outflow, and DI 











Figure 5.2  Substitution parameters λ (fraction natural SA inflow to DI inflow, solid line) and μ (fraction 







Figure 5.3  Inferred substitution rates as a percentage of total DI inflow, assuming diversion occurs either 
from SA inflow to DI inflow (solid line), or from SA outflow to DI inflow (dashed line). 
 
Figure 5.4  Inferred substitution of DI for SA, absolute numbers (meaning of lines as in Figure 5.3). 
 
5.2  Panel Estimation 
In this subsection we address potential shortcomings of the previous cross-sectional estimates, in particular the 
effects of unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity correlated with our instrument SA-1 may induce 
omitted variables bias in the estimates of the substitution parameters. We model time-constant municipality 
heterogeneity using both random and fixed effects. Our random effects model, which allows for more general 
serial correlation, largely generates the same results as the cross-section model. Using a fixed effects assumption 
we are able to derive robust lower bounds for substitution between SA and DI. 
5.2.1 Random effects 
We first allow for unobserved time-constant municipality heterogeneity by estimating a random effects model of 
all years combined. A municipality-specific error component ui is added to each of the three flow equations. In 14 
 
addition, we allow for exponential serial correlation of the time-varying error components. Several mechanisms 
may cause such serial correlation. Firstly, exogenous shocks to any of the three flows may typically last longer 
than one period. Secondly, a positive shock to a flow decreases the stock from which this flow originates, which 
will tend to suppress the flow in subsequent periods. And thirdly, since the SA flows affect the SA stock and, 
thereby, the model predictions for the flows in subsequent periods via the SA-1 regressor, the model 
endogenously introduces serial correlation of the errors. 
  We cannot predict what net serial correlation of the errors will result. In order to keep the number of 
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where  ~ (0, ) iu N u are the random effects, and 
|| t are the weights on the idiosyncratic shocks  , i . All 
coefficients on the explanatory variables, including the constants, remain year-specific to preserve maximum 
flexibility of the model. Hence, this model is a true generalization of the cross-sections we have estimated in 
Section 5.1. 
Figure 5.5  Inferred substitution of DI for SA with random effects and serial correlation added to the flow 
equations, absolute numbers (compare Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the substitution estimates we obtain. Estimates of substitution via either SA inflow or SA 
outflow differ more than in the cross-section analysis: however, recall that total substitution will be a convex 
combination of the two (Section 5.1), so the results are fully consistent with our cross-section estimates. Serial 
correlation is statistically significant but fairly small at about 4-5% for the SA inflow and for the DI inflow, and 
13% for the SA outflow (see Appendix C). The random effects are also significant which suggests the presence 
of unobserved municipality heterogeneity. However, we find that the idiosyncratic error components dominate 
for all equations in all years: the variance of the time-varying error component νit is about twice as large as that 
of the random effect ui for all equations. This implies that the efficiency loss from estimating yearly cross-15 
 
sections is small. It does not necessarily mean that bias due to unobserved heterogeneity must also be small, so 
we next estimate bias-robust lower limits for our coefficients of interest using a „fixed effects‟ assumption.   
5.2.2 Fixed effects 
To exclude the possibility of bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, we next estimate a „fixed effects‟ model. If 
there should remain unobserved variables that strongly and significantly influence the true risk of being disabled 
and that happen to correlate strongly with the SA-1 rate rather than with the „DI Other‟ rate or any of the other 
control variables, then the observed effect of SA-1 on DI may be due in part to omitted variables bias.  
  We employ a fixed effects specification slightly different from the standard model. Rather than assuming 
that the unobserved components of municipality heterogeneity are constant in time, we assume here that the bias 
they cause (if any) in the observed variable of interest is constant. The motivation for this fixed effects model is 
that SA-1 does not change much over the period of observation for a given municipality. Hence the potential bias 
caused by unobserved population characteristics that also do not change much over this time span can 
reasonably be expected to be constant. This way, an estimated change in the effect of SA-1 on DI inflow implies 
that at least the entire change is due to substitution, which puts a lower bound on substitution between SA and 
DI. The top left panel in Figure 5.6 illustrates this; a technical description is given in Appendix B.  
Figure 5.6  Inferred substitution of DI for SA: lower limits based on fixed effects assumption. Top left: 
illustration of our fixed effects assumption. Top right to bottom right: bias-robust lower limits for substitution 
parameters, fractions, and numbers for the years 2005-2008 (lower sets of lines, meaning as in Figure 5.3) 






















In words: suppose that the observed positive effect of SA-1 on DI inflow in the years 2001-2004 entirely consists 
of bias due to some omitted variable, which may be a true disability risk factor and, hence, not a valid identifier 16 
 
of substitution. Under our fixed effects assumption, this bias is constant. The observed increase in the effect of 
SA-1 on DI inflow from 2005 onwards must then be due to (increased) substitution, and hence we can estimate 
lower limits on substitution in the years 2005-2008 that are robust to such bias. Figure 5.6 shows these lower 
bounds for the two scenarios in which substitution between SA and DI occurs through either SA inflow or SA 
outflow. We see that, using the change in the effect of SA-1 as a bias-robust identifier of substitution, a 
minimum of one third of total DI inflow in 2006-2008 were in fact SA (candidate) recipients diverted to DI. 
This is a conservative estimate; any smaller bias (including a negative one) in the effect of SA-1 on DI inflow 
implies that actual substitution in 2005-2008 was higher than this. If there is no substantial bias, then our 
substitution estimates of Section 5.1 hold. We can thus conclude that between one third and two thirds of DI 
inflow was diverted from SA. 
5.2.3 Robustness checks 
Finally, we check assumptions of our model and their influence on the results. First, we investigate whether the 
assumed error distribution impacts our estimation results. Second, we test if there is a problem with the 
endogeneity of SA-1. Finally, we investigate if time-varying omitted variables contaminate our estimation results 
by instrumenting them with observed control variables. 
Table 5.3  Substitution parameters and standard errors for the baseline model and alternative 
specifications: residual-kurtosis-matched t(5) error distribution, and the SA-1 regressor fixed to SA2003 from 2004 
onwards. 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Cross-section model 
λ  0.032  (0.010)  0.025  (0.009)  0.036  (0.009)  0.029  (0.009)  0.052  (0.008)  0.090  (0.010)  0.116  (0.011)  0.083  (0.011) 
μ  0.027  (0.009)  0.025  (0.010)  0.043  (0.011)  0.033  (0.010)  0.056  (0.010)  0.087  (0.011)  0.107  (0.013)  0.093  (0.015) 
Random effects model 
λ  0.041  (0.011)  0.035  (0.009)  0.046  (0.007)  0.039  (0.008)  0.057  (0.009)  0.086  (0.013)  0.122  (0.014)  0.106  (0.015) 
μ  0.031  (0.085)  0.030  (0.008)  0.048  (0.008)  0.038  (0.008)  0.051  (0.008)  0.061  (0.009)  0.084  (0.010)  0.086  (0.012) 
Fixed effects model (lower limits) 
λ                  0.025  (0.008)  0.061  (0.010)  0.087  (0.012)  0.058  (0.011) 
μ                  0.025  (0.009)  0.055  (0.011)  0.075  (0.012)  0.061  (0.014) 
t(5)-distributed error terms 
λ  0.040  (0.008)  0.033  (0.008)  0.044  (0.007)  0.034  (0.008)  0.059  (0.008)  0.091  (0.010)  0.120  (0.011)  0.100  (0.012) 
μ  0.035  (0.008)  0.033  (0.008)  0.056  (0.010)  0.040  (0.010)  0.066  (0.010)  0.085  (0.010)  0.108  (0.012)  0.107  (0.015) 
SA-1 fixed to SA2003 after 2004 
λ  0.032  (0.010)  0.025  (0.009)  0.036  (0.009)  0.029  (0.008)  0.053  (0.008)  0.091  (0.011)  0.114  (0.012)  0.092  (0.012) 
μ  0.027  (0.009)  0.025  (0.010)  0.043  (0.011)  0.033  (0.010)  0.058  (0.010)  0.088  (0.012)  0.107  (0.014)  0.109  (0.017) 
Since we estimate our model using maximum likelihood, we first investigate whether our results are affected by 
the assumption of normally distributed errors. Inspection of the residuals of our model shows that, while there 
are no obvious outliers, there is excess kurtosis in all three flow equations (4.7)-(4.9) for all years. We therefore 
re estimate our model with a multivariate, residual kurtosis matched t(5) distribution for the error terms. The 
results are shown in Table 5.3 and the left panel of Figure 5.7. The estimates of the substitution parameters 
increase slightly, but remain close to the original estimates for every year. We conclude that our results are not 17 
 
substantially influenced by the assumption of normally distributed errors. If anything, the normality assumption 
leads to a slightly conservative estimate of substitution. 
  Secondly, we investigate the potential effect of substitution-induced endogeneity of the SA-1 regressor. 
The SA-1 regressor, serving as our identifying variable on the right-hand side of the DI inflow equation, will 
change as persons are diverted from SA to DI. Whether this is a problem for our estimation is a matter of 
timescales. At the very peak of substitution in 2007, almost 10,000 individuals were diverted to DI from a 
dynamic SA stock of more than 300,000, implying a timescale of endogenous change of more than 30 years. 
Changes in substitution rates due to other factors such as changes in incentives or changes in the stock of 
substitutable persons (a subset of the total SA stock) are expected to happen on much shorter timescales. And in 
fact, they are observed to happen on much shorter timescales (recall Figure 5.4). We thus expect the endogenous 
effect to be negligible. We verify this by estimating a simple alternative model in which we fix the SA-1 
regressor to SA2003 for all years after 2004. Depletion of the SA stock due to strongly increased diversion to DI 
after 2004 can then no longer lead to an endogenous increase in the effect of SA-1 on DI inflow. The results are 
collected in Table 5.3 and the right-hand panel of Figure 5.7. We essentially observe the same increase in 
substitution as before. We conclude that endogeneity of the SA-1 regressor is not important for the results 
presented in this paper. 
 
Figure 5.7  Estimated substitution rates for variations on the baseline model, in absolute numbers per year. 
Left: kurtosis-matched t(5) distribution instead of normal distribution for the error terms. Right: SA-1 regressor 












Thirdly, we investigate whether the omission of time-varying explanatory variables has caused bias in the 
estimation results. Anticipated correlations between observed control variables and potential unobserved time-
varying effects allow us to check if the latter could cause omitted variables bias in the estimated substitution 
parameters. Concretely, it has been hypothesized that an increase in the number of children going to advanced 
special schools, combined with expanded information services targeting these groups, has contributed to the 
increase in DI inflow (UWV, 2007). The idea is that many attending these schools apply for DI benefits upon 
finishing school; the schools may effectively promote the move to DI (see also Section 2). We have no direct 
data on the number of children going to such schools and the quality of information services provided. But we 
can anticipate that if such an unobserved time-varying effect has indeed affected the DI inflow over the years, 
then we will observe an increase in the effect of the 18-19 year old population on DI inflow (recall from Section 
2 that DI benefits can be, and often are, claimed from age 18). Figure 5.8 shows this effect over time for our 
baseline model of Section 5.1. We also include an alternative specification in which the SA-1 regressor was 18 
 
omitted in order to give the 18-19 year old population variable every chance to explain the observed DI inflow 
increase. Clearly, however, no significant upward trend occurs in the effect of the 18-19 year old population. 
The 18-19 year old population itself has also remained stable between 2001-2008 (see Table 3.1), so it would 
appear that increased attendance of advanced special schools has had little or no net effect on DI inflow. 
Basically, those flowing from these schools into DI would also have entered the scheme if they had not gone to 
such schools. On the same grounds, we consider it unlikely that unobserved time-varying population 
characteristics carrying intrinsic disability risk (say genetic or environmental) have affected our results: if they 
had, we would expect them to have caused an increase in the effect of the 18-19 year old population on DI 
inflow, which we do not observe. These results strengthen confidence in our estimates of substitution between 
SA and DI, and in particular the increase after 2004. 
 
Figure 5.8  Effect of population aged 18-19 on DI inflow rate, both as a fraction of population 18-64, in our 
baseline model. Compare with the effect of SA-1 volume on DI inflow as shown in Figure 5.1. The dashed line 
shows an alternative specification in which the SA-1 regressor was omitted. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
We have presented a model for, and estimates of, substitution between Social Assistance (SA) and a Disability 
Insurance scheme for individuals with no employment history (DI) over the period 2001-2008 in the 
Netherlands, using a balanced panel data set of 440 Dutch municipalities. We find that at least one third of those 
flowing into the disability insurance scheme in the period 2006-2008 have been diverted from social assistance. 
Because the inflow into the DI scheme has increased rapidly over the period considered, the absolute number of 
diversions has more than doubled, mostly over the period 2004-2007. Relaxation of our fixed effects assumption 
even results in higher estimates of substitution towards DI. 
  This rapid increase in substitution between the two schemes is strikingly coincident with the social 
assistance funding reforms that took place over this period, which strongly increased municipalities‟ financial 
incentives to reduce their number of social assistance recipients. Since municipalities are not financially 
responsible for the DI scheme, a causal connection between the two events seems logical. Hence, the increased 
substitution of disability insurance for social assistance looks to be due to misaligned interests of different levels 
of government. It is true that substitution may be attractive for the individual as well (see Section 2), but this 
was also true prior to the decentralization of social assistance in 2004, so individual incentives are unlikely to be 
the main driver of the observed increase in substitution after 2004. 19 
 
    The idea behind transferring financial responsibility for social assistance to local government was, 
naturally, to create incentives for local government to look more carefully at the allocation of social assistance. 
While this appears to have worked, based simply on the observed lower social assistance volume and inflow 
(Van Es, 2010), part of the reduction has apparently flowed towards the centrally administered DI scheme (and 
potentially also to other schemes). The exact mechanism by which local governments have diverted people from 
social assistance to disability insurance cannot be deduced from our results, but is of secondary importance for 
this paper. It is likely that the observed substitution consists of two parts: a transitory „cleaning up‟ of 
municipalities‟ existing SA files, and an increased structural rate of substitution of DI for SA. The substitution 
estimates for our final year 2008 are slightly (though not significantly) lower than for 2007, suggesting that 
some transitory effect may have taken place in the early years after the reform. The net result of local 
governments‟ actions may well have been a less efficient allocation of welfare expenditure: young people may 
have been „written off‟ for the labour market too quickly. This negative „vertical externality‟ shows the need to 
have a good understanding of the degree to which different welfare schemes can act as substitutes, not just for 
reforms that alter individuals‟ incentives but also for reforms that alter the incentives of different layers of 
government. 
  A connotation is that we must be careful identifying the increased substitution with increased misuse of 
the DI scheme since, technically, all DI entrants have been examined medically and are by construction entitled 
to DI benefits. One could even argue that there was substantial „hidden disability‟ in the SA scheme before 
2004, which was then discovered and transferred to DI. Nevertheless the idea of „hidden disability‟ seems odd, 
since already 10% of the total population aged 18-64 were receiving some form of disability benefits in 2004 
while only 3.5% were receiving social assistance. Moreover, individuals have always had incentives to be in the 
DI scheme rather than the SA scheme, contrary to the typical case of hidden unemployment in disability 
schemes. After all, the phenomenon of „hidden unemployment‟ in disability schemes is well-documented in the 
literature.
8 
  A further reform that has been proposed for the Netherlands is to transfer financial responsibility for DI 
to local governments as well. This would remove local governments‟ incentives to divert young people from 
social assistance to disability insurance. Our study shows that this will likely have an effect, and that further 
investigation of vertical externalities in social insurance is important for answering the final question: what is 
the optimal distribution of responsibilities over different layers of government? 
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Appendix A: Restrictions on the reduced form model 







s sf s f sd s d
sf s f f fd f d
sd s d fd f d d
  (A.1) 
where s, f and d subscripts again correspond to SA inflow, SA outflow and DI inflow respectively, and writing 




s sf s f sd s d
sf s f f fd f d
sd s d fd f d d
  (A.2) 
we obtain the following set of restrictions on the parameters of the reduced-form model in terms of the 
parameters of the structural model: 
00 1 ss ,  (A.3) 
1 bs bs ,  (A.4) 
00 1 ff ,  (A.5) 
1 bf bf ,  (A.6) 
0 0 0 0 d d s f ,  (A.7) 
bd bs bf ,  (A.8) 
2 22 1 ss ,  (A.9) 
2 22 1 ff ,  (A.10) 
2 2 2 2 2 2
,0 , , 0 0 2 2 2 d d s f fd f sf d sd s d sf ,  (A.11) 
,0 11 sf s f sf s f ,  (A.12) 
2
,0 ,0 1 1 1 sd s d sd s d s sf s f ,  (A.13) 
2
,0 ,0 1 1 1 fd f d fd f d sf s f f   (A.14) 
as imposed by (4.1)-(4.3). The above set of equations is represented by g(θ) in Eq. (4.10) and (4.11). 
Appendix B: The fixed effects model 
Formally, assuming an unobserved disability risk factor denoted by xud and using index t for the year of 
observation and index i for the municipality, our DI inflow equation (4.9) becomes: 
0 , 0 , , , , , , it d it d t bd it bd t ud it ud t d it D x x x   (B.1) 
in which case the estimate of γbd,t , the effect of a variable of interest in a cross-section estimation (say the effect 
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where the second term on the right-hand side is the bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, and the (co)variances 
are between municipalities. As explained in Section 5.1, such bias is unlikely to be substantial in our case, given 
the magnitude and significance of the effect of SA-1 relative to the effects of the most obvious disability risk 
factors and of the other control variables. It is, however, possible to make a stronger statement. The 
conventional way to address unobserved heterogeneity is to assume that the unobserved component of 
municipality heterogeneity is constant over time: 
,, ud it ud t i x c   (B.3) 
and to estimate a corresponding “fixed effects” model based on within-municipality variability, e.g., 
0 , 0 , 0 , , , ( ) ( ) it i d it d i d bd it bd i bd d it D x x x D x   (B.4) 
where bars indicate averages over the time dimension of the panel. The unobserved component of municipality 
heterogeneity has dropped out of the equation under the assumption (B.3). Note that assumption (B.3) is quite 
strong. In particular, omitted-variables bias may still occur in a fixed-effects model if only the following, 
slightly weaker statement holds true: 
,, [] ud it ud t i E c x   (B.5) 
where E indicates the expectation value, since then in general 
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  (B.6) 
which is the bias in coefficient γbd due to unobserved variable xud. This term remains unequal to zero in the limit 
T  where T is the baseline of panel dimension t. 
In Section 5.2, we assume “fixed effects” in the sense that 
, , ,
,
cov ( , )
constant
var ( )




  (B.7) 
where the (co)variances are between municipalities.   In case of no serial correlation of the errors, or in the limit 
T , this “fixed effects” assumption can in fact be weakened: 
, , ,
,
cov ( , )
constant
var ( )





  (B.8) 
in contrast with the classical assumption (B.3). 
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Appendix C: Estimation results in tabular form 
Table C.1  Reduced-form cross-section estimates (x100), SA inflow, SA outflow, and DI inflow equations 
(top to bottom). C*: constants. V*: covariance matrix Σ (x10
6). 
    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008 
Immigran  -0.347  (0.195)  -0.311  (0.213)  -0.422  (0.218)  -1.237  (0.218)  -0.560  (0.196)  -0.085  (0.190)  -0.357  (0.148)  -0.441  (0.189) 
LowSkill  0.852  (0.282)  0.779  (0.308)  0.451  (0.324)  1.172  (0.543)  0.564  (0.451)  0.527  (0.366)  0.655  (0.231)  0.752  (0.359) 
Disabled  0.110  (0.550)  0.845  (0.546)  0.525  (0.593)  0.681  (0.621)  1.524  (0.590)  1.971  (0.606)  -0.802  (0.505)  0.565  (0.697) 
Urban  0.000  (0.029)  0.010  (0.034)  0.008  (0.036)  0.053  (0.037)  -0.012  (0.033)  0.020  (0.031)  0.020  (0.025)  0.021  (0.032) 
Rented  0.075  (0.135)  -0.074  (0.142)  0.071  (0.149)  -0.036  (0.149)  -0.429  (0.133)  -0.062  (0.134)  0.077  (0.119)  -0.393  (0.153) 
SinglePa  0.218  (0.532)  -0.127  (0.558)  -0.489  (0.555)  -0.104  (0.535)  -1.020  (0.483)  -1.267  (0.453)  -0.525  (0.347)  -0.362  (0.451) 
Age1819  0.617  (1.944)  3.391  (1.999)  4.692  (2.082)  -0.296  (2.071)  2.429  (1.968)  1.638  (1.846)  -0.722  (1.427)  -1.240  (1.800) 
Young  -0.495  (0.358)  -0.839  (0.374)  -1.017  (0.384)  -0.188  (0.386)  0.063  (0.360)  -0.612  (0.340)  -0.594  (0.246)  -0.294  (0.309) 
UIOut  -0.619  (0.335)  0.477  (0.215)  -0.564  (0.331)  -1.145  (0.742)  0.177  (0.479)  0.550  (0.397)  0.277  (0.306)  -0.184  (0.322) 
UIOut-1  0.564  (0.323)  -0.878  (0.326)  1.112  (0.289)  -0.245  (0.523)  -1.361  (0.736)  -0.266  (0.423)  0.385  (0.388)  0.221  (0.475) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.421  (0.292)  -0.678  (0.256)  0.984  (0.400)  0.096  (0.414)  -0.493  (0.528)  -0.103  (0.213)  0.509  (0.502) 
GDP-1  -0.009  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.005)  0.009  (0.005)  0.010  (0.009)  -0.019  (0.007)  -0.009  (0.006)  -0.015  (0.004)  -0.003  (0.007) 
GDP-2  -  -  -0.011  (0.006)  -0.013  (0.005)  0.011  (0.007)  0.002  (0.007)  -0.009  (0.006)  -0.011  (0.004)  -0.008  (0.006) 
SA-1  28.056  (1.324)  32.683  (1.476)  36.379  (1.574)  36.281  (1.479)  35.453  (1.239)  30.640  (1.225)  28.588  (1.010)  35.771  (1.332) 
Immigran  -0.926  (0.187)  -0.716  (0.182)  -0.614  (0.169)  -0.864  (0.180)  -0.841  (0.158)  -0.638  (0.182)  -0.685  (0.163)  -0.716  (0.181) 
LowSkill  0.784  (0.279)  0.693  (0.266)  0.523  (0.214)  1.060  (0.368)  0.345  (0.335)  0.412  (0.283)  0.359  (0.266)  0.900  (0.364) 
Disabled  -0.044  (0.530)  0.069  (0.464)  -0.224  (0.458)  -0.569  (0.516)  -0.406  (0.474)  0.497  (0.584)  -0.763  (0.559)  -1.047  (0.670) 
Urban  -0.018  (0.029)  -0.008  (0.029)  0.056  (0.028)  0.027  (0.030)  0.013  (0.026)  0.034  (0.030)  0.025  (0.027)  -0.006  (0.030) 
Rented  0.070  (0.130)  -0.065  (0.121)  -0.067  (0.114)  -0.089  (0.124)  -0.203  (0.107)  -0.261  (0.129)  -0.066  (0.132)  -0.253  (0.147) 
SinglePa  0.247  (0.509)  0.203  (0.473)  -0.452  (0.427)  -0.144  (0.444)  -0.585  (0.388)  -0.253  (0.436)  -0.375  (0.384)  0.480  (0.434) 
Age1819  1.536  (1.856)  1.837  (1.703)  1.241  (1.601)  -2.916  (1.717)  -0.762  (1.574)  -1.173  (1.779)  -1.551  (1.580)  -4.155  (1.731) 
Young  -0.691  (0.344)  -1.046  (0.319)  -0.880  (0.297)  0.190  (0.321)  -0.253  (0.287)  -0.039  (0.327)  -0.390  (0.272)  0.215  (0.297) 
UIOut  -0.312  (0.330)  0.435  (0.186)  -0.285  (0.219)  -1.129  (0.503)  0.168  (0.356)  0.253  (0.307)  0.266  (0.349)  -0.092  (0.327) 
UIOut-1  0.232  (0.318)  -0.599  (0.281)  0.628  (0.192)  -0.111  (0.354)  -1.100  (0.546)  -0.391  (0.327)  0.079  (0.443)  0.075  (0.485) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.154  (0.251)  -0.401  (0.169)  0.778  (0.271)  0.400  (0.307)  -0.123  (0.409)  -0.115  (0.246)  0.264  (0.510) 
GDP-1  -0.012  (0.006)  -0.008  (0.004)  0.008  (0.003)  0.008  (0.006)  -0.013  (0.005)  -0.008  (0.005)  -0.012  (0.004)  -0.009  (0.007) 
GDP-2  -  -  -0.014  (0.005)  -0.004  (0.003)  0.003  (0.005)  0.003  (0.005)  -0.006  (0.005)  -0.008  (0.005)  -0.010  (0.006) 
SA-1  35.263  (1.262)  34.293  (1.252)  33.132  (1.208)  34.396  (1.230)  37.028  (0.995)  37.959  (1.179)  38.848  (1.116)  38.093  (1.283) 
Immigran  -0.124  (0.046)  -0.123  (0.045)  -0.182  (0.048)  -0.155  (0.046)  -0.061  (0.050)  -0.111  (0.056)  -0.265  (0.061)  -0.191  (0.065) 
LowSkill  -0.014  (0.049)  0.010  (0.065)  -0.038  (0.067)  0.052  (0.088)  -0.151  (0.078)  -0.075  (0.111)  -0.064  (0.120)  0.069  (0.153) 
Disabled  0.611  (0.122)  0.487  (0.117)  0.573  (0.131)  0.732  (0.131)  0.729  (0.150)  1.245  (0.180)  1.119  (0.210)  1.562  (0.239) 
Urban  -0.016  (0.008)  -0.001  (0.007)  0.001  (0.008)  0.011  (0.008)  0.008  (0.008)  0.002  (0.009)  0.021  (0.010)  0.019  (0.011) 
Rented  0.038  (0.032)  0.024  (0.030)  -0.024  (0.033)  0.038  (0.032)  0.022  (0.034)  0.090  (0.040)  0.153  (0.050)  0.058  (0.053) 
SinglePa  0.054  (0.123)  0.127  (0.118)  0.075  (0.122)  0.008  (0.126)  -0.336  (0.123)  -0.535  (0.135)  -0.409  (0.144)  -0.322  (0.155) 
Age1819  1.821  (0.447)  1.652  (0.426)  1.782  (0.458)  2.143  (0.435)  0.742  (0.497)  1.682  (0.549)  1.768  (0.592)  1.730  (0.620) 
Young  -0.150  (0.083)  -0.164  (0.079)  -0.091  (0.085)  -0.182  (0.081)  -0.012  (0.089)  -0.152  (0.101)  -0.147  (0.103)  0.105  (0.106) 
UIOut  -0.054  (0.058)  0.109  (0.046)  -0.119  (0.068)  0.095  (0.119)  0.153  (0.083)  -0.088  (0.120)  0.001  (0.153)  -0.036  (0.137) 
UIOut-1  0.103  (0.056)  -0.086  (0.069)  0.141  (0.059)  -0.148  (0.085)  0.172  (0.127)  0.275  (0.125)  -0.097  (0.196)  0.012  (0.205) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.068  (0.062)  -0.016  (0.052)  0.181  (0.065)  -0.068  (0.071)  0.008  (0.147)  0.144  (0.110)  0.075  (0.214) 
GDP-1  -0.002  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.000  (0.002)  0.003  (0.002)  -0.004  (0.003) 
GDP-2  -  -  0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.001  (0.002)  0.001  (0.002)  0.002  (0.003) 
SA-1  0.915  (0.302)  0.836  (0.313)  1.376  (0.346)  1.096  (0.327)  1.954  (0.315)  3.023  (0.365)  3.765  (0.422)  3.245  (0.458) 
C_S  -0.014  (0.151)  -0.120  (0.163)  -0.005  (0.168)  -0.096  (0.172)  0.577  (0.166)  0.092  (0.196)  -0.248  (0.164)  -0.227  (0.201) 
C_F  0.033  (0.143)  0.061  (0.139)  0.091  (0.126)  0.083  (0.143)  0.473  (0.133)  0.283  (0.189)  0.054  (0.181)  -0.030  (0.193) 
C_D  -0.056  (0.035)  -0.089  (0.035)  -0.030  (0.036)  -0.142  (0.037)  -0.077  (0.042)  -0.077  (0.059)  -0.029  (0.068)  -0.067  (0.069) 
V_SF  1.649  (0.128)  1.363  (0.115)  1.259  (0.113)  1.534  (0.126)  0.838  (0.091)  1.132  (0.108)  0.682  (0.072)  1.028  (0.102) 
V_SD  0.061  (0.024)  0.033  (0.024)  0.049  (0.028)  0.007  (0.026)  0.070  (0.026)  0.096  (0.029)  0.095  (0.025)  0.047  (0.032) 
V_FD  0.055  (0.023)  0.031  (0.020)  0.023  (0.021)  -0.005  (0.022)  0.030  (0.021)  0.053  (0.028)  0.147  (0.028)  0.029  (0.031) 
V_S  2.203  (0.149)  2.324  (0.157)  2.597  (0.175)  2.605  (0.176)  2.127  (0.143)  2.043  (0.138)  1.221  (0.082)  1.944  (0.131) 
V_F  2.012  (0.136)  1.686  (0.114)  1.549  (0.104)  1.794  (0.121)  1.373  (0.093)  1.895  (0.128)  1.492  (0.101)  1.797  (0.121) 
V_D  0.116  (0.008)  0.105  (0.007)  0.127  (0.009)  0.116  (0.008)  0.138  (0.009)  0.182  (0.012)  0.211  (0.014)  0.230  (0.016) 
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Table C.2  Structural-form cross-section estimates (x100), SA inflow, SA outflow, and DI inflow equations 
(top to bottom), λ mechanism. C*: constants. V*: covariance matrix Σ0 (x10
6). 
    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008 
Immigran  -0.358  (0.201)  -0.319  (0.219)  -0.438  (0.227)  -1.274  (0.224)  -0.590  (0.207)  -0.093  (0.208)  -0.404  (0.167)  -0.481  (0.206) 
LowSkill  0.880  (0.292)  0.799  (0.316)  0.469  (0.337)  1.208  (0.560)  0.595  (0.476)  0.578  (0.402)  0.741  (0.262)  0.820  (0.391) 
Disabled  0.113  (0.568)  0.866  (0.560)  0.545  (0.616)  0.702  (0.640)  1.608  (0.623)  2.165  (0.667)  -0.908  (0.572)  0.616  (0.761) 
Urban  0.000  (0.030)  0.010  (0.034)  0.009  (0.038)  0.054  (0.038)  -0.013  (0.034)  0.022  (0.035)  0.023  (0.028)  0.023  (0.034) 
Rented  0.078  (0.140)  -0.076  (0.146)  0.074  (0.154)  -0.037  (0.154)  -0.453  (0.140)  -0.068  (0.147)  0.087  (0.135)  -0.428  (0.167) 
SinglePa  0.225  (0.549)  -0.131  (0.572)  -0.507  (0.576)  -0.108  (0.551)  -1.076  (0.509)  -1.392  (0.497)  -0.594  (0.392)  -0.395  (0.491) 
Age1819  0.637  (2.008)  3.478  (2.051)  4.869  (2.162)  -0.305  (2.133)  2.563  (2.077)  1.799  (2.028)  -0.818  (1.615)  -1.352  (1.963) 
Young  -0.512  (0.370)  -0.861  (0.384)  -1.056  (0.399)  -0.193  (0.398)  0.067  (0.380)  -0.673  (0.373)  -0.672  (0.278)  -0.321  (0.337) 
UIOut  -0.639  (0.346)  0.489  (0.221)  -0.585  (0.344)  -1.180  (0.764)  0.187  (0.506)  0.604  (0.437)  0.313  (0.346)  -0.201  (0.351) 
UIOut-1  0.583  (0.334)  -0.900  (0.335)  1.154  (0.301)  -0.253  (0.538)  -1.436  (0.777)  -0.292  (0.464)  0.435  (0.439)  0.241  (0.518) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.432  (0.299)  -0.703  (0.266)  1.013  (0.413)  0.101  (0.437)  -0.542  (0.580)  -0.117  (0.241)  0.555  (0.547) 
GDP-1  -0.009  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.005)  0.009  (0.005)  0.010  (0.009)  -0.020  (0.007)  -0.010  (0.007)  -0.016  (0.004)  -0.003  (0.008) 
GDP-2  -  -  -0.011  (0.006)  -0.014  (0.005)  0.012  (0.007)  0.003  (0.008)  -0.010  (0.006)  -0.013  (0.005)  -0.009  (0.007) 
SA-1  28.972  (1.394)  33.519  (1.528)  37.755  (1.642)  37.377  (1.518)  37.408  (1.317)  33.663  (1.331)  32.353  (1.163)  39.016  (1.439) 
Immigran  -0.926  (0.187)  -0.716  (0.182)  -0.614  (0.169)  -0.864  (0.180)  -0.841  (0.158)  -0.638  (0.182)  -0.685  (0.163)  -0.716  (0.181) 
LowSkill  0.784  (0.279)  0.693  (0.266)  0.523  (0.214)  1.060  (0.368)  0.345  (0.335)  0.412  (0.283)  0.359  (0.266)  0.900  (0.364) 
Disabled  -0.044  (0.530)  0.069  (0.464)  -0.224  (0.458)  -0.569  (0.516)  -0.406  (0.474)  0.497  (0.584)  -0.763  (0.559)  -1.047  (0.670) 
Urban  -0.018  (0.029)  -0.008  (0.029)  0.056  (0.028)  0.027  (0.030)  0.013  (0.026)  0.034  (0.030)  0.025  (0.027)  -0.006  (0.030) 
Rented  0.070  (0.130)  -0.065  (0.121)  -0.067  (0.114)  -0.089  (0.124)  -0.203  (0.107)  -0.261  (0.129)  -0.066  (0.132)  -0.253  (0.147) 
SinglePa  0.247  (0.509)  0.203  (0.473)  -0.452  (0.427)  -0.144  (0.444)  -0.585  (0.388)  -0.253  (0.436)  -0.375  (0.384)  0.480  (0.434) 
Age1819  1.536  (1.856)  1.837  (1.703)  1.241  (1.601)  -2.916  (1.717)  -0.762  (1.574)  -1.173  (1.779)  -1.551  (1.580)  -4.155  (1.731) 
Young  -0.691  (0.344)  -1.046  (0.319)  -0.880  (0.297)  0.190  (0.321)  -0.253  (0.287)  -0.039  (0.327)  -0.390  (0.272)  0.215  (0.297) 
UIOut  -0.312  (0.330)  0.435  (0.186)  -0.285  (0.219)  -1.129  (0.503)  0.168  (0.356)  0.253  (0.307)  0.266  (0.349)  -0.092  (0.327) 
UIOut-1  0.232  (0.318)  -0.599  (0.281)  0.628  (0.192)  -0.111  (0.354)  -1.100  (0.546)  -0.391  (0.327)  0.079  (0.443)  0.075  (0.485) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.154  (0.251)  -0.401  (0.169)  0.778  (0.271)  0.400  (0.307)  -0.123  (0.409)  -0.115  (0.246)  0.264  (0.510) 
GDP-1  -0.012  (0.006)  -0.008  (0.004)  0.008  (0.003)  0.008  (0.006)  -0.013  (0.005)  -0.008  (0.005)  -0.012  (0.004)  -0.009  (0.007) 
GDP-2  -  -  -0.014  (0.005)  -0.004  (0.003)  0.003  (0.005)  0.003  (0.005)  -0.006  (0.005)  -0.008  (0.005)  -0.010  (0.006) 
SA-1  35.263  (1.262)  34.293  (1.252)  33.132  (1.208)  34.396  (1.230)  37.028  (0.995)  37.959  (1.179)  38.848  (1.116)  38.093  (1.283) 
Immigran  -0.113  (0.045)  -0.115  (0.045)  -0.166  (0.048)  -0.118  (0.048)  -0.030  (0.050)  -0.103  (0.056)  -0.218  (0.060)  -0.151  (0.066) 
LowSkill  -0.042  (0.052)  -0.010  (0.068)  -0.055  (0.068)  0.017  (0.093)  -0.182  (0.080)  -0.127  (0.113)  -0.150  (0.121)  0.000  (0.156) 
Disabled  0.607  (0.122)  0.465  (0.119)  0.554  (0.133)  0.712  (0.135)  0.645  (0.155)  1.051  (0.189)  1.225  (0.205)  1.511  (0.245) 
Urban  -0.016  (0.007)  -0.002  (0.007)  0.001  (0.008)  0.009  (0.008)  0.009  (0.008)  0.000  (0.009)  0.018  (0.010)  0.017  (0.011) 
Rented  0.036  (0.031)  0.026  (0.030)  -0.027  (0.033)  0.039  (0.032)  0.046  (0.033)  0.096  (0.040)  0.143  (0.049)  0.094  (0.053) 
SinglePa  0.047  (0.124)  0.130  (0.117)  0.093  (0.119)  0.011  (0.127)  -0.280  (0.117)  -0.410  (0.128)  -0.340  (0.139)  -0.289  (0.155) 
Age1819  1.801  (0.445)  1.566  (0.432)  1.604  (0.468)  2.152  (0.439)  0.608  (0.499)  1.521  (0.553)  1.863  (0.586)  1.842  (0.628) 
Young  -0.134  (0.082)  -0.143  (0.079)  -0.053  (0.084)  -0.176  (0.081)  -0.015  (0.088)  -0.092  (0.100)  -0.069  (0.100)  0.132  (0.107) 
UIOut  -0.034  (0.058)  0.097  (0.046)  -0.098  (0.070)  0.129  (0.123)  0.144  (0.084)  -0.142  (0.122)  -0.035  (0.153)  -0.020  (0.138) 
UIOut-1  0.085  (0.056)  -0.063  (0.070)  0.099  (0.062)  -0.141  (0.087)  0.247  (0.129)  0.301  (0.126)  -0.148  (0.193)  -0.008  (0.206) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.057  (0.062)  0.010  (0.053)  0.151  (0.068)  -0.073  (0.072)  0.056  (0.149)  0.158  (0.109)  0.029  (0.216) 
GDP-1  -0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.003  (0.001)  0.001  (0.002)  0.005  (0.002)  -0.004  (0.003) 
GDP-2  -  -  0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.002  (0.002)  0.003  (0.002)  0.002  (0.003) 
SA-1  0.032  (0.010)  0.025  (0.009)  0.036  (0.009)  0.029  (0.009)  0.052  (0.008)  0.090  (0.010)  0.116  (0.011)  0.083  (0.011) 
C_S  -0.014  (0.156)  -0.123  (0.168)  -0.005  (0.174)  -0.099  (0.177)  0.609  (0.175)  0.101  (0.215)  -0.281  (0.185)  -0.248  (0.220) 
C_F  0.033  (0.143)  0.061  (0.139)  0.091  (0.126)  0.083  (0.143)  0.473  (0.133)  0.283  (0.189)  0.054  (0.181)  -0.030  (0.193) 
C_D  -0.055  (0.034)  -0.085  (0.035)  -0.030  (0.036)  -0.139  (0.037)  -0.109  (0.041)  -0.086  (0.058)  0.004  (0.069)  -0.047  (0.072) 
V_SF  1.703  (0.133)  1.397  (0.118)  1.307  (0.118)  1.580  (0.131)  0.884  (0.096)  1.244  (0.120)  0.772  (0.082)  1.121  (0.112) 
V_SD  -0.011  (0.035)  -0.027  (0.033)  -0.051  (0.039)  -0.074  (0.037)  -0.050  (0.034)  -0.116  (0.043)  -0.074  (0.035)  -0.142  (0.046) 
V_FD  0.002  (0.029)  -0.004  (0.024)  -0.024  (0.024)  -0.052  (0.026)  -0.017  (0.022)  -0.058  (0.031)  0.057  (0.029)  -0.065  (0.034) 
V_S  2.349  (0.166)  2.444  (0.171)  2.797  (0.195)  2.765  (0.193)  2.367  (0.165)  2.466  (0.175)  1.563  (0.113)  2.313  (0.165) 
V_F  2.012  (0.136)  1.686  (0.114)  1.549  (0.104)  1.794  (0.121)  1.373  (0.093)  1.895  (0.128)  1.492  (0.101)  1.797  (0.121) 
V_D  0.115  (0.008)  0.105  (0.007)  0.127  (0.009)  0.118  (0.008)  0.137  (0.009)  0.183  (0.013)  0.207  (0.014)  0.238  (0.016) 
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Table C.3  Structural-form cross-section estimates (x100), SA inflow, SA outflow, and DI inflow equations 
(top to bottom), µ mechanism. C*: constants. V*: covariance matrix Σ0 (x10
6). 
    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008 
Immigran  -0.347  (0.195)  -0.311  (0.213)  -0.422  (0.218)  -1.237  (0.218)  -0.560  (0.196)  -0.085  (0.190)  -0.357  (0.148)  -0.441  (0.189) 
LowSkill  0.852  (0.282)  0.779  (0.308)  0.451  (0.324)  1.172  (0.543)  0.564  (0.451)  0.527  (0.366)  0.655  (0.231)  0.752  (0.359) 
Disabled  0.110  (0.550)  0.845  (0.546)  0.525  (0.593)  0.681  (0.621)  1.524  (0.590)  1.971  (0.606)  -0.802  (0.505)  0.565  (0.697) 
Urban  0.000  (0.029)  0.010  (0.034)  0.008  (0.036)  0.053  (0.037)  -0.012  (0.033)  0.020  (0.031)  0.020  (0.025)  0.021  (0.032) 
Rented  0.075  (0.135)  -0.074  (0.142)  0.071  (0.149)  -0.036  (0.149)  -0.429  (0.133)  -0.062  (0.134)  0.077  (0.119)  -0.393  (0.153) 
SinglePa  0.218  (0.532)  -0.127  (0.558)  -0.489  (0.555)  -0.104  (0.535)  -1.020  (0.483)  -1.267  (0.453)  -0.525  (0.347)  -0.362  (0.451) 
Age1819  0.617  (1.944)  3.391  (1.999)  4.692  (2.082)  -0.296  (2.071)  2.429  (1.968)  1.638  (1.846)  -0.722  (1.427)  -1.240  (1.800) 
Young  -0.495  (0.358)  -0.839  (0.374)  -1.017  (0.384)  -0.188  (0.386)  0.063  (0.360)  -0.612  (0.340)  -0.594  (0.246)  -0.294  (0.309) 
UIOut  -0.619  (0.335)  0.477  (0.215)  -0.564  (0.331)  -1.145  (0.742)  0.177  (0.479)  0.550  (0.397)  0.277  (0.306)  -0.184  (0.322) 
UIOut-1  0.564  (0.323)  -0.878  (0.326)  1.112  (0.289)  -0.245  (0.523)  -1.361  (0.736)  -0.266  (0.423)  0.385  (0.388)  0.221  (0.475) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.421  (0.292)  -0.678  (0.256)  0.984  (0.400)  0.096  (0.414)  -0.493  (0.528)  -0.103  (0.213)  0.509  (0.502) 
GDP-1  -0.009  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.005)  0.009  (0.005)  0.010  (0.009)  -0.019  (0.007)  -0.009  (0.006)  -0.015  (0.004)  -0.003  (0.007) 
GDP-2  -  -  -0.011  (0.006)  -0.013  (0.005)  0.011  (0.007)  0.002  (0.007)  -0.009  (0.006)  -0.011  (0.004)  -0.008  (0.006) 
SA-1  28.056  (1.324)  32.683  (1.476)  36.379  (1.574)  36.281  (1.479)  35.453  (1.239)  30.640  (1.225)  28.588  (1.010)  35.771  (1.332) 
Immigran  -0.902  (0.183)  -0.699  (0.177)  -0.588  (0.162)  -0.837  (0.175)  -0.797  (0.150)  -0.588  (0.168)  -0.619  (0.148)  -0.655  (0.166) 
LowSkill  0.763  (0.272)  0.676  (0.259)  0.501  (0.205)  1.026  (0.356)  0.327  (0.317)  0.380  (0.260)  0.324  (0.240)  0.823  (0.333) 
Disabled  -0.043  (0.517)  0.067  (0.453)  -0.215  (0.439)  -0.551  (0.500)  -0.385  (0.449)  0.458  (0.537)  -0.689  (0.504)  -0.958  (0.614) 
Urban  -0.017  (0.028)  -0.008  (0.028)  0.054  (0.027)  0.027  (0.029)  0.013  (0.025)  0.031  (0.028)  0.022  (0.025)  -0.006  (0.028) 
Rented  0.068  (0.126)  -0.063  (0.118)  -0.064  (0.110)  -0.087  (0.120)  -0.192  (0.101)  -0.240  (0.119)  -0.059  (0.119)  -0.231  (0.135) 
SinglePa  0.241  (0.496)  0.198  (0.462)  -0.433  (0.410)  -0.139  (0.430)  -0.554  (0.368)  -0.233  (0.401)  -0.338  (0.347)  0.439  (0.397) 
Age1819  1.496  (1.808)  1.792  (1.661)  1.189  (1.534)  -2.823  (1.663)  -0.721  (1.491)  -1.080  (1.638)  -1.401  (1.428)  -3.801  (1.586) 
Young  -0.673  (0.335)  -1.021  (0.311)  -0.844  (0.285)  0.184  (0.310)  -0.239  (0.272)  -0.036  (0.301)  -0.352  (0.246)  0.197  (0.272) 
UIOut  -0.304  (0.322)  0.425  (0.181)  -0.273  (0.210)  -1.093  (0.487)  0.159  (0.338)  0.233  (0.283)  0.240  (0.315)  -0.084  (0.299) 
UIOut-1  0.226  (0.310)  -0.584  (0.274)  0.602  (0.184)  -0.108  (0.343)  -1.042  (0.517)  -0.360  (0.301)  0.071  (0.400)  0.069  (0.443) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.150  (0.245)  -0.384  (0.162)  0.753  (0.263)  0.379  (0.291)  -0.113  (0.376)  -0.104  (0.222)  0.241  (0.467) 
GDP-1  -0.012  (0.006)  -0.008  (0.004)  0.008  (0.003)  0.007  (0.006)  -0.013  (0.005)  -0.008  (0.005)  -0.011  (0.004)  -0.009  (0.007) 
GDP-2  -  -  -0.014  (0.005)  -0.004  (0.003)  0.003  (0.005)  0.003  (0.005)  -0.005  (0.004)  -0.007  (0.004)  -0.009  (0.006) 
SA-1  34.347  (1.263)  33.457  (1.269)  31.757  (1.238)  33.300  (1.276)  35.074  (1.024)  34.936  (1.203)  35.083  (1.087)  34.848  (1.342) 
Immigran  -0.100  (0.046)  -0.106  (0.045)  -0.157  (0.049)  -0.128  (0.047)  -0.016  (0.050)  -0.061  (0.057)  -0.198  (0.059)  -0.130  (0.066) 
LowSkill  -0.034  (0.051)  -0.007  (0.067)  -0.059  (0.068)  0.019  (0.093)  -0.169  (0.080)  -0.108  (0.112)  -0.098  (0.117)  -0.008  (0.156) 
Disabled  0.612  (0.121)  0.485  (0.116)  0.583  (0.131)  0.750  (0.131)  0.750  (0.149)  1.206  (0.184)  1.193  (0.201)  1.651  (0.239) 
Urban  -0.016  (0.008)  -0.001  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.008)  0.010  (0.008)  0.007  (0.008)  -0.001  (0.009)  0.018  (0.010)  0.020  (0.011) 
Rented  0.036  (0.031)  0.026  (0.030)  -0.022  (0.033)  0.040  (0.032)  0.033  (0.034)  0.111  (0.040)  0.159  (0.048)  0.080  (0.053) 
SinglePa  0.048  (0.124)  0.122  (0.119)  0.094  (0.120)  0.013  (0.126)  -0.306  (0.120)  -0.514  (0.135)  -0.373  (0.138)  -0.363  (0.160) 
Age1819  1.781  (0.447)  1.608  (0.428)  1.730  (0.462)  2.236  (0.434)  0.782  (0.497)  1.776  (0.554)  1.918  (0.571)  2.084  (0.627) 
Young  -0.132  (0.082)  -0.139  (0.078)  -0.055  (0.084)  -0.188  (0.082)  0.002  (0.088)  -0.149  (0.102)  -0.109  (0.098)  0.087  (0.109) 
UIOut  -0.046  (0.058)  0.099  (0.046)  -0.107  (0.069)  0.131  (0.122)  0.144  (0.084)  -0.108  (0.121)  -0.024  (0.150)  -0.028  (0.139) 
UIOut-1  0.097  (0.056)  -0.071  (0.070)  0.115  (0.061)  -0.144  (0.086)  0.230  (0.129)  0.306  (0.126)  -0.105  (0.190)  0.005  (0.206) 
UIOut-2  -  -  0.064  (0.062)  0.001  (0.053)  0.156  (0.068)  -0.089  (0.072)  0.018  (0.147)  0.155  (0.107)  0.052  (0.216) 
GDP-1  -0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.003  (0.001)  0.000  (0.002)  0.005  (0.002)  -0.004  (0.003) 
GDP-2  -  -  0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.001  (0.002)  0.002  (0.002)  0.002  (0.003) 
SA-1  0.027  (0.009)  0.025  (0.010)  0.043  (0.011)  0.033  (0.010)  0.056  (0.010)  0.087  (0.011)  0.107  (0.013)  0.093  (0.015) 
C_S  -0.014  (0.151)  -0.120  (0.163)  -0.005  (0.168)  -0.096  (0.172)  0.577  (0.166)  0.092  (0.196)  -0.248  (0.164)  -0.227  (0.201) 
C_F  0.032  (0.140)  0.060  (0.136)  0.087  (0.120)  0.080  (0.138)  0.448  (0.126)  0.261  (0.174)  0.049  (0.163)  -0.027  (0.177) 
C_D  -0.056  (0.034)  -0.090  (0.034)  -0.033  (0.036)  -0.144  (0.037)  -0.102  (0.041)  -0.100  (0.058)  -0.034  (0.066)  -0.065  (0.071) 
V_SF  1.606  (0.125)  1.329  (0.113)  1.207  (0.109)  1.485  (0.123)  0.794  (0.086)  1.042  (0.100)  0.616  (0.066)  0.940  (0.094) 
V_SD  0.018  (0.028)  0.000  (0.027)  -0.004  (0.031)  -0.042  (0.030)  0.026  (0.027)  0.006  (0.031)  0.029  (0.025)  -0.041  (0.035) 
V_FD  0.003  (0.028)  -0.010  (0.025)  -0.039  (0.025)  -0.061  (0.027)  -0.041  (0.023)  -0.090  (0.031)  0.002  (0.027)  -0.114  (0.035) 
V_S  2.203  (0.149)  2.324  (0.157)  2.597  (0.175)  2.605  (0.176)  2.127  (0.143)  2.043  (0.138)  1.221  (0.082)  1.944  (0.131) 
V_F  1.909  (0.133)  1.605  (0.112)  1.423  (0.101)  1.682  (0.118)  1.232  (0.086)  1.605  (0.113)  1.217  (0.087)  1.504  (0.109) 
V_D  0.115  (0.008)  0.105  (0.007)  0.128  (0.009)  0.118  (0.008)  0.139  (0.009)  0.185  (0.013)  0.197  (0.013)  0.238  (0.016) 
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Table C.4  Reduced-form random-effects estimates (x100), SA inflow, SA outflow, and DI inflow equations 
(top to bottom). C*: constants. V*: covariance matrix of idiosyncratic errors (x10
6). RAN*: random effects variance 
(x10
6). RHO*: serial correlation. 
    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008 
Immigran  0.177  (0.151)  0.034  (0.188)  -0.091  (0.173)  -0.476  (0.208)  -0.283  (0.177)  0.194  (0.182)  -0.117  (0.117)  -0.110  (0.159) 
LowSkill  0.366  (0.131)  0.311  (0.189)  0.026  (0.052)  -0.013  (0.109)  -0.030  (0.290)  0.442  (0.181)  0.406  (0.185)  0.443  (0.173) 
Disabled  -0.303  (0.433)  0.693  (0.503)  0.836  (0.522)  1.645  (0.579)  0.783  (0.632)  1.130  (0.573)  -0.148  (0.843)  0.894  (0.670) 
Urban  -0.023  (0.025)  -0.038  (0.022)  -0.051  (0.027)  -0.018  (0.030)  -0.057  (0.022)  -0.019  (0.026)  -0.001  (0.030)  -0.043  (0.022) 
Rented  -0.029  (0.132)  -0.012  (0.059)  0.179  (0.097)  -0.003  (0.337)  -0.145  (0.092)  0.044  (0.120)  0.092  (0.090)  -0.060  (0.115) 
SinglePa  -0.008  (0.171)  0.198  (0.385)  -0.293  (0.452)  -0.716  (0.581)  -0.041  (0.251)  -0.288  (0.397)  0.006  (0.122)  0.131  (0.343) 
Age1819  0.383  (1.529)  2.094  (1.205)  3.006  (1.537)  1.458  (1.316)  3.593  (1.596)  2.557  (1.396)  0.447  (1.498)  -2.456  (1.310) 
Age2029  -0.050  (0.340)  -0.166  (0.390)  -0.201  (0.330)  -0.020  (0.628)  0.138  (0.477)  -0.147  (0.287)  -0.063  (0.444)  0.312  (0.299) 
UIOut  -0.283  (0.155)  0.187  (0.131)  -0.165  (0.165)  -0.292  (0.257)  0.108  (0.164)  -0.006  (0.175)  0.248  (0.193)  -0.089  (0.152) 
UIOut-1  0.254  (0.151)  -0.263  (0.143)  0.307  (0.124)  0.222  (0.177)  -0.703  (0.212)  -0.158  (0.146)  0.018  (0.260)  0.346  (0.171) 
GDP-1  0.002  (0.003)  0.005  (0.003)  0.004  (0.002)  0.001  (0.002)  -0.009  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.003)  -0.005  (0.002)  0.000  (0.002) 
SA-1  27.465  (1.004)  29.706  (1.480)  34.059  (1.269)  35.658  (1.715)  30.805  (1.336)  25.052  (1.241)  23.651  (2.143)  28.355  (1.397) 
Immigran  -0.698  (0.160)  -0.619  (0.145)  -0.466  (0.183)  -0.605  (0.145)  -0.745  (0.140)  -0.461  (0.158)  -0.609  (0.143)  -0.533  (0.140) 
LowSkill  0.372  (0.153)  0.191  (0.160)  0.093  (0.147)  0.100  (0.205)  -0.011  (0.145)  0.295  (0.198)  0.243  (0.145)  0.552  (0.160) 
Disabled  -0.642  (0.379)  -0.458  (0.358)  -0.412  (0.379)  -0.304  (0.453)  -0.630  (0.405)  -0.240  (0.505)  -1.189  (0.484)  -1.154  (0.493) 
Urban  -0.031  (0.030)  -0.028  (0.021)  0.002  (0.051)  0.000  (0.051)  -0.008  (0.019)  -0.026  (0.022)  -0.006  (0.033)  -0.011  (0.021) 
Rented  -0.018  (0.164)  -0.059  (0.126)  -0.012  (0.146)  -0.100  (0.102)  -0.102  (0.102)  -0.070  (0.092)  -0.064  (0.097)  -0.163  (0.112) 
SinglePa  -0.339  (0.376)  -0.476  (0.374)  -0.817  (0.350)  -1.190  (0.403)  -0.594  (0.330)  -0.715  (0.368)  -0.513  (0.341)  -0.271  (0.339) 
Age1819  0.298  (1.242)  0.040  (0.583)  0.293  (1.295)  -1.034  (1.467)  0.070  (1.115)  -0.508  (1.497)  0.028  (0.148)  -0.281  (0.813) 
Age2029  -0.807  (0.273)  -0.980  (0.213)  -0.713  (0.223)  -0.203  (0.317)  -0.429  (0.311)  -0.373  (0.254)  -0.829  (0.201)  -0.419  (0.214) 
UIOut  -0.204  (0.143)  0.162  (0.107)  -0.141  (0.128)  -0.277  (0.353)  0.053  (0.133)  -0.132  (0.153)  -0.013  (0.358)  0.022  (0.147) 
UIOut-1  0.151  (0.138)  -0.246  (0.109)  0.135  (0.097)  0.046  (0.289)  -0.385  (0.171)  -0.210  (0.133)  -0.083  (0.512)  -0.230  (0.156) 
GDP-1  -0.001  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.002)  0.003  (0.002)  -0.001  (0.004)  -0.006  (0.002)  -0.001  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.003  (0.003) 
SA-1  38.899  (1.016)  37.845  (1.073)  35.898  (1.064)  38.903  (1.061)  38.624  (0.992)  41.128  (1.085)  42.413  (1.030)  42.118  (1.159) 
Immigran  -0.129  (0.045)  -0.134  (0.041)  -0.140  (0.034)  -0.158  (0.039)  -0.066  (0.049)  -0.082  (0.054)  -0.188  (0.053)  -0.223  (0.053) 
LowSkill  0.013  (0.045)  0.037  (0.051)  -0.034  (0.041)  -0.022  (0.044)  -0.048  (0.054)  0.047  (0.052)  0.084  (0.057)  0.065  (0.064) 
Disabled  0.493  (0.110)  0.331  (0.105)  0.507  (0.114)  0.606  (0.117)  0.529  (0.135)  1.042  (0.156)  1.015  (0.178)  1.372  (0.205) 
Urban  -0.011  (0.006)  -0.004  (0.006)  0.002  (0.006)  0.001  (0.006)  0.010  (0.006)  0.000  (0.011)  0.023  (0.008)  0.020  (0.008) 
Rented  0.010  (0.026)  -0.007  (0.024)  -0.060  (0.025)  -0.008  (0.033)  -0.004  (0.023)  0.020  (0.030)  0.051  (0.039)  -0.010  (0.044) 
SinglePa  0.038  (0.136)  0.144  (0.086)  -0.010  (0.040)  0.039  (0.100)  -0.204  (0.097)  -0.255  (0.124)  -0.205  (0.121)  -0.172  (0.131) 
Age1819  1.133  (0.368)  0.987  (0.338)  1.078  (0.339)  1.285  (0.357)  0.225  (0.440)  1.108  (0.440)  1.814  (0.502)  1.063  (0.480) 
Age2029  -0.107  (0.073)  -0.079  (0.071)  0.040  (0.082)  -0.008  (0.069)  0.040  (0.076)  0.008  (0.096)  -0.095  (0.104)  0.188  (0.091) 
UIOut  -0.042  (0.039)  0.036  (0.031)  -0.029  (0.046)  0.093  (0.058)  0.095  (0.046)  -0.029  (0.053)  -0.001  (0.013)  0.005  (0.037) 
UIOut-1  0.033  (0.038)  -0.019  (0.030)  0.010  (0.036)  0.017  (0.042)  0.084  (0.061)  0.161  (0.045)  -0.027  (0.099)  -0.026  (0.066) 
GDP-1  -0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.001)  0.001  (0.001)  -0.002  (0.001) 
SA-1  1.177  (0.322)  1.087  (0.283)  1.636  (0.262)  1.429  (0.288)  1.857  (0.278)  2.344  (0.349)  3.298  (0.378)  3.346  (0.464) 
C_S  0.019  (0.088)  -0.095  (0.151)  -0.189  (0.082)  0.048  (0.126)  0.279  (0.136)  -0.025  (0.159)  -0.235  (0.180)  -0.201  (0.144) 
C_F  0.208  (0.093)  0.288  (0.097)  0.193  (0.087)  0.372  (0.095)  0.415  (0.090)  0.388  (0.131)  0.284  (0.124)  0.273  (0.117) 
C_D  0.003  (0.033)  -0.018  (0.032)  0.019  (0.025)  -0.066  (0.027)  -0.050  (0.034)  -0.075  (0.044)  -0.020  (0.070)  -0.003  (0.062) 
V_SF  0.407  (0.047)  0.302  (0.042)  0.351  (0.047)  0.343  (0.048)  0.161  (0.038)  0.337  (0.049)  0.103  (0.031)  0.225  (0.041) 
V_SD  0.006  (0.011)  0.001  (0.009)  0.012  (0.012)  0.012  (0.011)  0.005  (0.011)  0.019  (0.004)  0.015  (0.015)  0.005  (0.010) 
V_FD  0.004  (0.010)  -0.006  (0.008)  0.011  (0.009)  0.018  (0.009)  0.003  (0.010)  0.039  (0.008)  0.037  (0.013)  0.009  (0.011) 
V_S  0.779  (0.066)  0.784  (0.066)  0.914  (0.076)  0.910  (0.083)  0.791  (0.067)  0.927  (0.075)  0.525  (0.051)  0.792  (0.067) 
V_F  0.651  (0.056)  0.574  (0.048)  0.610  (0.052)  0.651  (0.054)  0.581  (0.049)  0.776  (0.061)  0.582  (0.051)  0.573  (0.049) 
V_D  0.049  (0.004)  0.041  (0.004)  0.049  (0.004)  0.047  (0.004)  0.060  (0.005)  0.078  (0.006)  0.093  (0.008)  0.102  (0.008) 
RAN_S  0.389  (0.009)                             
RAN_F  0.287  (0.006)                             
RAN_D  0.032  (0.001)                             
RHO_S  0.052  (0.011)                             
RHO_F  0.131  (0.011)                             
RHO_D  0.039  (0.011)                             
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